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Since the 1960s and 70s, theorists have claimed that political trust is fundamentally
important for democracy and political order. Rosanvallon (2008, 48–49) describes trust as
an ‘‘invisible institution’’ or ‘‘assumed stock of information’’, an essential ‘‘property of a
relationship between…governors and governed’’ in which a ‘‘politician’s reputation
becomes his certificate of warranty.’’ Political trust allows political authorities to provision
public goods to the electorate without resorting to repression or coercion (Parsons 1961,
53; Luhmann 1979, 56). Declines in political trust across advanced democracies in the
postwar era have been interpreted as a deterioration of state legitimacy (Easton 1975;
Luhmann 1979) and even a ‘‘crisis of democracy’’ (Huntington et al. 1975). Recent
research shows that low political trust levels are associated with tax fraud and low com-
pliance with the law (Hooghe and Marien 2010) as well as low generalized trust and social
capital (Rothstein 2003; Schyns and Koop 2010). The idea that political trust is important
for democracy or good governance motivates a great deal of empirical research on
developed democracies in Europe and the US (Hetherington 1998; Lipset and Schneider
1983; Marien 2011) and non-democracies such as China and Russia (Lovell 2001; Yang
and Tang 2010). Examining former Soviet political transitions, for instance, Bowser (2001,
17) argues that ‘‘if the countries of the FSU [Former Soviet Union] are to proceed to
genuinely representative and accountable democratic regimes they must seek to increase
public support for the state.’’
Although there is considerable consensus about the importance of political trust, there is
little consensus about its definition or measurement. Hooghe (2011, 270) criticizes
researchers’ dependence on standard ‘‘trust in government’’ survey questions ‘‘without
questioning their validity or even wondering what political trust actually refers to, or what
place the concept could have in democratic society.’’ Researchers do not usually propose
clear definitions of political trust but often take it to be a proxy for political legitimacy
(Almond and Verba 1963; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Chris-
tensen and Laegreid 2005; Coromina and Davidov 2013; Hooghe 2011; Hutchison and
Johnson 2011; Kim and Voorhees 2011; Mishler and Rose 2001; Newton 2007; Suh et al.
2012). A measure of political trust carries implicit information about what constitutes a
trustworthy institution for citizens. Beetham (2013, 11) defines political legitimacy as an
‘‘assessment of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of power
and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification.’’ Hetherington (1998,
791) conceives of political trust in a similar way, describing it as ‘‘a basic evaluative
orientation toward the government founded on how well the government is operating
according to people’s normative expectations.’’
We are, in principle, dealing with a very important and normatively charged concept
which is increasingly being studied in all parts of the world. Yet researchers continue to
rely on sum scores or averages of standard ‘‘trust in government’’ survey questions without
fully understanding what the concept means, or whether these measures tap into compa-
rable ideas across the countries in their sample. Precisely because of the normative and
subjective content of political trust, what constitutes a trustworthy institution is unlikely to
be the same for citizens in different cultural and regime contexts. Moreover, cross-national
research in more diverse environments enhances potential for measurement error resulting
from the data collection process with potentially detrimental consequences for regression
analysis. Prior to comparing the means or correlates of political trust survey indicators, it is
important to check that the indicators deliver similar and comparable understandings of
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political trust across populations. Little progress has been made in this direction even
though our ability to accurately theorize about the causes and consequences of political
trust depends on these empirical considerations.
To account for this weakness in the comparative literature, I aim to answer two ques-
tions about the measurement of political trust in 35 European and former Soviet countries
using the 2010 Life in Transition II Survey (LITS II). First, do standard ‘‘trust in gov-
ernment’’ survey indicators represent a single, comprehensive attitude of political trust?
Second, are different measurement models of political trust equivalent in all countries? In
other words, do measures of political trust travel successfully on the survey instrument
across borders? I will investigate these questions using multiple group confirmatory factor
analysis (Jo¨reskog 1971). Unlike most studies of the measurement equivalence of political
trust, the results of this study will help us determine our ability to compare the means and
correlates of the construct across both democracies and non-democracies.
2 Empirical Considerations
Data limitations are inevitable in the measurement of political trust. Most surveys do not
contain indicators which capture elements of institutional trustworthiness for a given
population. As a result, scholars typically produce sum scores or averages of survey
indicators measuring trust in a variety of political institutions on a likert scale (from strong
distrust to strong trust). Usually, little to no rationale accompanies these item choices. To
consider just a few examples from highly cited studies, Mishler and Rose (2001) examine
the sources of political trust in ten post-communist societies surveyed in the New
Democracies Barometer by averaging trust in the parliament, prime minister or president,
courts, police, parties and military. Chang and Chu (2006) and Chang (2013) use the East
Asian Barometer to estimate the effect of corruption on political trust in six Asian countries
by averaging trust in the president/prime minister, courts, national government, political
parties, parliament, civil service, military, police and local government. To assess the
importance of political capacity for political trust in environments with different levels of
violence, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) construct an additive index of trust in the exec-
utive, courts, police, armed forces, electoral commissions and government-run media for
16 countries surveyed in the Afrobarometer. Clausen et al. (2011) use the Gallup World
Poll to study political trust and corruption in 103 countries, obtaining an index of confi-
dence in public institutions by summing responses to a question on confidence in the
military, judicial system and courts, national government and honesty of elections. Similar
measurement approaches are taken in cross-national research projects on political trust in
Latin America (Seligson 2002; Stoyan et al. 2014), Asia (Wong et al. 2011), Sub-Saharan
Africa (Cho et al. 2007; Lavalle´e et al. 2008) and other global samples (Catterberg and
Moreno 2005; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012).
This prolific ‘‘kitchen sink’’ measurement approach is a problem if our goal is to draw
meaningful inferences about political trust across diverse societies. Comparing the correlates
of averaged or summed indicators across countries assumes that these indicators are (1)
reliable, unidimensional measures of political trust in each country and (2) mean the same
thing to respondents in each country. Could we assume, for instance, that citizens on the
democratic and autocratic parts of the regime spectrum have similar understandings of what
it means for an election to be honest? Can we be sure that fear to report true beliefs about the
executive is not biasing the responses of a person affected by a violent civil war? Do citizens
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of East Asian countries really evaluate the president and police in similar ways? Perhaps
petty corruption might reduce trust in the police but not in a charismatic president.
While testing for the validity and equivalence of empirical measures is common practice
in psychology and management studies, it is less recognized in political science (Adcock and
Collier 2001, 536; Ansolabehere et al. 2008, 228). Measurement error in survey research can
result from inherently different understandings of survey questions across different popu-
lations, as well as from method effects specific to the survey instrument. Survey imple-
mentation, translation, and question order can influence nonresponse patterns, uses of
extreme response categories and socially desirable responses by population (Davidov et al.
2014, 59–62; Podsakoff et al. 2012, 544). In applied research, cross-cultural comparisons of
attitudes toward democracy, levels of postmaterialism and left–right political ideology, for
instance, do not pass the test of measurement equivalence (Alema´n and Woods 2015;
Davidov et al. 2014). Delhey et al. (2011) find significant cross-national variation in the way
respondents interpret ‘‘generalized trust’’ in the World Values Survey by estimating their
‘‘trust radius’’, or the width of one’s notion of trust in ‘‘most’’ people. They find that the trust
radius is much smaller for people in countries with Confucian influence than for those in
countries with a Protestant heritage and modern economy, noting that such findings ‘‘throw
sufficient doubt on the cross-national validity of the standard trust question’’ (ibid, 793).
Measurement testing procedures are only recently appearing in political trust research.
Hooghe (2011) uses factor analysis to show that British citizens do not distinguish between
MPs, governing parties, opposition parties or the head of state regardless of political
sophistication or education. Suh et al. (2012, 516) demonstrate in a latent class analysis
that trust in government is part of a broader set of attitudes towards public and private
institutions like companies and civil associations in South Korea. A number of studies
implement a multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) of political trust
models in the European Social Survey (ESS), all finding relatively strong evidence for the
equivalence of political trust across subsets of countries and time points. The authors’
choices of indicators, however, are not theoretically consistent.
Allum et al. (2011, 42), for instance, use only trust in the parliament and politicians,
arguing that a prior confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) showed that trust in the legal
system, police, European parliament and UN constituted a separate dimension of trust.
Coromina and Davidov (2013, 41), however, choose trust in the parliament, legal system
and politicians using the same survey. They do not justify this precise combination of
indicators even though they acknowledge that legal institutions like courts are often
conceptualized separately from strictly political institutions because they are meant to be
impartial and focused on enforcing the rule of law (Jackson et al. 2011; Linde 2012;
Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Marien (2011) chooses the broadest set of indicators from the
ESS, including trust in the parliament, politicians, political parties, legal system and police,
detecting an error correlation between trust in the police and legal system. This finds some
confirmation in Schaap and Scheepers’ (2014) assessment of the measurement equivalence
of trust in police in 27 European countries. Andre´ (2014) also uses a broad range of
indicators in the ESS to test for the equivalence of political trust between EU natives and
migrants, but introduces three correlated errors to illustrate the multidimensionality of the
construct as distinctively political (measured by trust in politicians, parliament and polit-
ical parties), order/neutral (trust in the legal system and police) and international (trust in
the EU parliament and United Nations).
Although these papers have different theoretical purposes, it is striking how many
different models of political trust can fit mostly the same data in a single region of the
world. A cross-regime survey will likely invite even more variation in indicator selection
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and increase the potential for measurement error across countries. There is, however, no
substitute for conscientious measurement modeling in regression analysis. Feeding unre-
liable and non-equivalent measures into a pooled regression can undermine the validity of
substantive results. Reeskens and Hooghe (2008, 527) and Coromina and Davidov (2013,
48) show that using country means without accounting for measurement error and
equivalence results in incorrect country rankings on social and political trust. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001, 70) go as far as to argue that ‘‘subjective variables cannot reasonably
be used as dependent variables, given that the measurement error likely correlates in a very
causal way with the explanatory variables.’’ If a sum score of political trust is used as a
dependent variable, for example, predictors might not ultimately be explaining variation in
political trust scores, but rather the way those scores are over or under-reported. Westfall
and Yarkoni (2016, 12) and van der Veld and Saris (2011, 241) demonstrate that multiple
regression capitalizes on measurement error by incorrectly apportioning the amount of
explained variance in the dependent variable between different error-laden predictors. Both
authors recommend structural equation modeling (SEM) to control for measurement error
and thus more accurately determine each predictor’s effect on the outcome.
Ultimately, though political trust is considered an important object of study, it currently
rests on a weak theoretical and empirical foundation. Neglecting the criteria for empirical
measurement can undermine our ability to draw meaningful and accurate inferences about
substantive theories using regression analysis. While this issue is gaining traction in
political trust research, most tests of measurement equivalence remain limited to Europe
and specifically to the European Social Survey. Techniques like MGCFA have not yet
enriched measurement modeling in developing and authoritarian countries where survey
research has proliferated in the last decade. To help overcome this weakness, I will put to
test the ability of different measurement models of political trust to meet the requirements
of validity and equivalence across different cultures and regime types.
3 Case Selection and Data
Considerable region-specific research on political trust outside of Europe and the United
States has covered parts of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and selections of contemporary
and developing democracies. Political trust in parts of the former Soviet space has received
some empirical attention (Luhiste 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001; Wallace and
Latcheva 2006), although these regional samples have neglected countries in the Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia mainly due to a lack of data.
In this study I use the Life in Transition Survey II (LITS II) produced by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The cross-
sectional sample from late 2010 surveys almost 39,000 households in thirty-five countries
to assess public attitudes on a range of social, political and economic variables. This
sample contains all former Soviet countries, the Balkans, Eastern and Central Europe, and
some of Western Europe.1 Two –stage clustered, stratified sampling was employed across
1 Here is the full list of countries with each sample size in parentheses: Albania (1029), Armenia (948),
Azerbaijan (988), Belarus (895), Bosnia (1075), Bulgaria (1007), Croatia (997), Czech Republic (1006),
Estonia (989), France (1008), Georgia (959), Germany (1032), Great Britain (1447), Hungary (1028), Italy
(1046), Kazakhstan (943), Kyrgyzstan (992), Latvia (995), Lithuania (1003), Macedonia (1058), Moldova
(1023), Mongolia (980), Poland (1587), Romania (1068), Russia (1549), Serbia (1506), Slovakia (995),
Slovenia (984), Sweden (899), Tajikistan (996), Turkey (996), Ukraine (1547), Uzbekistan (1417), Kosovo
(1081), Montenegro (966).
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regions in each country.2 38,379 response observations (with at least 895 per country) are
used in this analysis due to missing values on all variables in 485 observations. Respon-
dents were asked ‘‘To what extent do you trust the following institutions?’’ (including the
presidency/monarchy, government/cabinet of ministers, regional government, local gov-
ernment, parliament, courts, political parties, armed forces, police) using a 1–5 likert scale
(from complete distrust to complete trust).
Helpfully, this survey includes Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, allowing for
systematic comparison between significantly different cultures and regime types. The
inclusion of these rarely-explored regions introduces striking variation on trust perceptions
into the sample. Looking only at the single ‘trust in government’ indicator without con-
trolling for measurement error, the most authoritarian countries appear to be the most
trusting of government with the exception of Sweden (Uzbekistan exhibiting the most trust,
followed by Tajikistan, Sweden, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Belarus, Georgia,
Montenegro and Russia). On this basis it could be argued that subjecting these indicators to
cross-national comparison inappropriately assumes that the institutions in question have
sufficiently similar roles and functions. After all, parliaments and political parties can be
considered fundamentally dysfunctional in autocracies like Uzbekistan, and thus incom-
parable to the same institutions in Sweden.
While it is true that a host of political institutions are functionally dissimilar in
democracies and autocracies, the parameter on which comparisons are drawn in the present
case (as in much of the political trust research) is based on perceptions, rather than
observable attributes of institutions. In testing the validity of a perception-based measure,
we must ensure that we are working with approximately similar associations of political
trust among respondents in multiple locations. If, say, the parliament proves to be different
enough in two countries so as to inspire inherently different understandings of its purposes
and functions, this deviation can be detected by measurement equivalence testing. Like-
wise, biases in response arising from fear to reveal genuine opinions or misinterpretations
based on faulty question translations or interview techniques may also lead to statistical
nonequivalence. A comparison between countries on the indicator would be deemed un-
interpretable in these cases. If, however, despite significant differences in institutional
functionality attitudes across countries refer to the same approximate idea, we can proceed
with comparisons on the perception-based measures even in diverse regime contexts.
4 Analytical Strategy
I use Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA), a powerful statistical tool
in the family of structural equation modeling commonly used to assess the measurement
equivalence of a latent construct across populations. MGCFA is typically employed after
valid measurement models have been specified in all groups (in this case, countries) either
via exploratory factor analysis (EFA) or a strong theoretical foundation, and tested for
appropriate ‘‘goodness of fit’’ to survey response data via confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA). More specifically, the purpose of EFA is to explore inter-correlations among a set
of indicators to generate the smallest number of unique factors that can best explain these
correlations (Brown 2006, 20). In CFA, rather than simply exploring data for sets of
patterns, the researcher uses theoretical reasoning to make a priori specifications of the




measurement model, constraining specific indicators to load on specific factors. This
procedure tests the validity of the researcher’s measurement model by showing how much
the model specification adheres to covariance patterns in the survey data.
Measurement equivalence is used interchangeably with the statistical term ‘‘invari-
ance,’’ which refers to ‘‘whether or not, under different conditions of observing and
studying phenomena, measurement operations yield measures of the same attribute’’ (Horn
and McArdle 1992, 117; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998, 78). Conventionally, three
stages of invariance must be achieved before the comparison of means can occur. When
testing for configural invariance, we want to understand whether the same survey indictors
measure the same latent construct in all groups. Reaching this level means that the same
basic meaning and structure of political trust exists in all countries. Metric invariance
refers to the equality of factor loadings on the construct across groups. A unit change in the
latent factor of political trust will affect scores on political trust survey questions by the
same magnitude across countries. Reaching this level of invariance is sufficient for
meaningful cross-cultural comparisons of covariances and unstandardized regression
coefficients. That is, we can be confident that changes in political trust scores arise from
real differences in the underlying construct rather than nuisance variables or method effects
(Byrne et al. 1989; Millsap 2011). Finally, scalar invariance refers to the equality of
intercepts across groups. In this case, differences in indicator means result from differences
in latent factor means (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998, 80). Although this level of
invariance is typically required to meaningfully compare factor means across groups,
partial scalar invariance is generally considered sufficient if at least two indicators per
factor have invariant loadings and intercepts in each group (Byrne et al. 1989; Byrne 2012,
198; Brown 2006, 81–82). While respondents might understand survey questions similarly
(given metric invariance), it may still be problematic to compare means if the model fails
to achieve partial scalar invariance.
I follow the literature in assuming that political trust indicators reflect a broader attitude
toward political institutions; they do not generate it like education, income and occupation
generate the concept of socioeconomic status. Indicators like trust in the parliament,
political parties and prime minister have been shown to be highly correlated and inter-
changeable in the CFA and MGCFA literature, which is the opposite of what one would
expect of a formative or ‘generating’ approach to index construction. In the latter approach,
items should have a distinct influence on the measured construct in a way that it would lose
substantive meaning without each item. High inter-correlations among items would signal
redundancy and multicollinearity rather than reliable internal consistency (Diamantopoulos
and Siguaw 2006, 267). It would be hard to argue that any single political trust indicator
adds a distinct or essential contribution to a person’s broader political orientation. More
realistically, political culture inside a country affects how one relates to a number of
political institutions (Marien 2011, 17). The arrow of influence thus moves from the latent,
unobserved dimension of political trust to one’s position on the observed indicators.
5 Constructing Four Measurement Models
Due to the sheer number of survey items used in the literature without a theoretical
rationale, I consider different plausible measurement models of political trust. I begin with
a simple exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in each country using a broad range of com-
monly used indicators. From these solutions and some theoretical consideration, I construct
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four measurement models of political trust and subject them to tests of measurement
validity and equivalence. While the EFA solutions are no substitute for theory, they
strongly suggest that indicators as diverse as trust in the government, parliament, parties,
police, armed forces and courts do not form a unidimensional model of political trust in
most countries.3
Firstly, EFA output for approximately half of the countries suggests that a separate
factor accounts for trust in regional and local political institutions, indicating that many
citizens differentiate between local and federal levels of government. To test for this
possibility, I construct Model 1 by specifying trust in the government, parliament, political
parties, regional and local government to load on a ‘‘political trust’’ latent variable, adding
an error correlation between trust in the regional and local government. While the survey is
unclear about what ‘‘regional’’ and ‘‘local’’ politics entail, it is likely that many respon-
dents associate ‘‘regional’’ politics with the rayon, a Soviet-era administrative division of
government slightly below the federal level which many (though not all) states retained
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The local level will likely correspond to city and
town districts closer to the individual. Some variation might be expected between countries
which inherited this structure from the Soviet Union and those which did not in Eastern or
Central Europe. In Bulgaria, for instance, the rayon refers to a city-level rather than
national government subdivision. If this model specification produces good fit to the data in
most countries, we might conclude that local and regional political trust responses co-vary
together in ways that cannot be accounted for by the political trust factor. At the same time,
regional political trust might be more associated with federal-level political trust in former
Soviet countries.
Secondly, EFA solutions show that citizens trust the police and armed forces in a different
way than they trust political institutions like the government and parliament. Despite the lack
of theory to support this dimension of political trust, the police and armed forces indicators
form salient loadings on a separate factor in most countries in the sample. One possibility is
that these institutions are the only ones which can legally exercise force to protect citizens.
At least in principle, they may represent deeper notions of order that go beyond the tides of
party politics, eliciting notions of patriotism or legitimacy which the parliament or gov-
ernment do not. To test for this ‘‘protective’’ dimensionality, I specify trust in the govern-
ment, parliament, political parties, armed forces and police to load on a single factor, adding
an error correlation between the latter two indicators. If this specification produces a good fit
to the data in most countries, we can conclude that respondents think about the police and
armed forces differently than they think about political institutions.
Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, many authors argue that people evaluate the courts and
police differently from the government or parliament because they are meant to be
impartial and devoted to the maintenance of the rule of law and criminal justice. My EFA
solutions do not consistently support this argument partly because trust in the courts loads
on factors accounting for trust in political institutions like the government and parliament
in authoritarian former Soviet states. It is likely that people living under politically
repressive regimes might not believe that judicial and political institutions are independent
cFig. 1 These diagrams represent linear factor models in which the latent (unobserved) political trust factor
explains variation in observed indicators. Errors (in small circles) represent variation in observed indicators
left unexplained by the latent factor. Correlated errors are represented by curved arrows, which indicate
special covariances between indicators for theoretically specified reasons
3 The EFA solutions are available in the Online Appendix.
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of each other. I test whether this is the case by specifying trust in the government, par-
liament, political parties, courts and police to load on one ‘political trust’ factor with an
error correlation between the courts and police. This specification may produce poorer fit in
more politically repressive contexts.
Because indicators involving courts, armed forces, police and regional government are
subject to error correlations and separate dimensions of political trust, they are likely to
cause problems for cross-national equivalence. In the interest of capturing the largest
amount of countries for an appropriate cross-national regression or mean comparison, in
Model 4 I specify a simple political trust factor measured by trust in the government,
parliament, political parties and local government. This model is closest to other CFA
models of political trust using the European Social Survey and should produce the best fit
to the data in most countries.
For ease of interpretation, I have included path diagrams of each measurement model in
Fig. 1. To check for the robustness of these models to alternative specifications, I compare
each model to a bi-dimensional model in which the two items originally specified to have
correlated errors are reflected by a separate factor. I also compare Model 4 to one
excluding trust in the local government, keeping the factor strictly limited to federal-level
political institutions. Across all models, I exclude the ‘trust in the presidency/monarchy’
indicator. British respondents would have been evaluating trust in the Queen, French
respondents the French President and Belarusians an autocratic leader in power since 1994.
A cross country comparison on such an indicator would be de-facto uninterpretable based
on its heterogeneous content. This point finds confirmation in the EFA output, which does
not show consistent factor loading patterns of the indicator across countries.
I begin with separate country CFAs and follow up with invariance testing on each model
using Mplus 7. I run each model using Maximum Likelihood estimation, which takes into
account all available data. When evaluating factor loadings, I consider a salient, stan-
dardized loading to be higher than 0.30 (Brown 2006). To assess each model’s goodness of
fit, I use several global fit statistics, including the Chi square statistic, the RMSEA (root
mean square error of approximation), the CFI (comparative fit index) and the SRMR
(standardized root mean square residual). To reach acceptable fit, CFI should be greater
than 0.95, SRMR below 0.10 and RMSEA below 0.08 (Schermelleh-Engel and Moos-
brugger 2003). I evaluate local model fit by considering expected parameter changes
(EPC), modification indices (MIs) and the power of the MI test using the JRule for Mplus
package (Saris, Satorra and van der Veld 2011; Oberski 2009).4 Since I use ML estimation
on large sample sizes in each country, I do not use the Chi square difference test to assess
the extent of the degradation of model fit between different levels of invariance. The full
output, including standardized factor loadings and fit statistics for each country in each
model, is available in the Online Appendix.
6 Results: Model 1
In Model 1, trust in the government, parliament, political parties, local and regional
government load on one factor with an error correlation between the latter two indicators.
Due to missing information on the regional trust indicator, Great Britain, Hungary,
4 I set EPC values higher than 0.15 for unstandardized factor loadings and 0.20 for intercepts as cutoff




Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia were not included in the analysis.
Off the bat, there appears to be interesting variation in the way the model behaves across
the surveyed territory. I ordered the countries by the ascending error correlation between
regional and local political trust (Fig. 2). In the bulk of the former Soviet countries
alongside Bosnia and Turkey, the extent to which regional and local political trust have a
special relationship that cannot be accounted for by the political trust factor is relatively
small, but gets progressively bigger in Western and Eastern Europe.
Azerbaijan has the smallest error correlation (0.199), while Croatia has the largest
(0.707). This means that local and regional political trust is decisively more related to trust
in central political institutions in the former Soviet states than it is in Eastern and Western
Europe. It is likely that regional and local political trust can load directly on a political trust
factor without an error correlation in Azerbaijan, while in Croatia and select Eastern
European countries, regional and local political trust might be modeled by a separate factor
entirely. This could be due to different understandings of what constitutes ‘‘regional’’
politics or it could signify that citizens in former Soviet countries perceive that local and
regional politics are subject to control by the federal center.
As expected, the same structure of the model is not present in several countries, pre-
venting the model from reaching configural invariance across 28 countries. I use JRule to
assist in detecting countries with the highest misspecifications. Several countries demon-
strated more than one misspecification (for instance significant MIs recommend double
error correlations between trust in the government and regional government, or political
parties and parliament) which I chose not to correct for lack of a theoretical rationale. After
removing Albania, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Bulgaria and Estonia on these
grounds, the model was able to achieve borderline configural invariance in 21 countries
(chi sq = 756.971, DF = 84, RMSEA = 0.086, CFI = 0.990, SRMR = 0.014). These 21
countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, France,
Georgia, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania,
Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Though RMSEA is a bit higher than
desired, JRule shows no misspecifications.
Fig. 2 Countries are ranked by the ascending error correlation between regional and local political trust
with 95 percent confidence intervals. This error correlation represents the proportion of shared variation
between these indicators which cannot be explained by a political trust latent factor
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The model reached metric invariance with mostly acceptable fit statistics. After I freely
estimated loadings for trust in political parties in Belarus, Uzbekistan and Georgia, trust in
government in Azerbaijan and trust in local government and parliament in France, the
model achieved partial metric invariance (chi sq = 1244.946, DF = 158,
RMSEA = 0.079, CFI = 0.985, SRMR = 0.059). As expected, model fit deteriorated in
the scalar invariance test. After I relaxed equality constraints on intercepts for trust in the
government, local government and political parties in all countries and released one more
factor loading constraint in four countries, the model achieved borderline acceptable partial
scalar invariance (chi sq = 1910.107, DF = 174, RMSEA = 0.096, CFI = 0.975,
SRMR = 0.074). Standardized factor loadings are substantial and significant in all
countries. I have reported unstandardized factor loadings on the partial scalar model in
Table 5. It is possible to compare correlates of political trust across countries using this
latent factor. Even mean comparisons are possible with some caution (Table 1).
I compared this model to a bi-dimensional model in which trust in the government,
parliament and political parties is reflected by one factor and trust in the regional and local
government is reflected by a second factor. It is reasonable to test the validity of this model
particularly because several countries in the sample have a very high error correlation
between local and regional trust. This model also reaches borderline partial scalar
invariance with slightly better fit statistics across the same 21 countries (chi
sq = 1878.912, DF = 184, RMSEA = 0.092, CFI = 0.976, SRMR = 0.057). Compar-
isons of correlates and cautious comparisons of means are also possible using this bi-
dimensional measurement model of political trust.
7 Results: Model 2
In Model 2, trust in the government, parliament, political parties, armed forces and police
load on one factor with an error correlation between the latter two indicators. In this
‘‘protective’’ trust model, I test whether respondents distinguish between strictly political
institutions and institutions which can use force to offer protection. Using JRule, I
Table 1 Model 1: error correlation between regional and local government (21 countries)Data source
EBRD and World Bank. All available data are used in ML estimation
Chi square DF RMSEA CFI SRMR
Configural 756.971 84 0.086 0.990 0.014
Metric 1456.574 164 0.085 0.982 0.073
Partial metric 1244.946 158 0.079 0.985 0.059
Scalar 3709.260 238 0.116 0.951 0.107
Partial scalar 1910.107 174 0.096 0.975 0.074
Compare: bi-dimensional model (regional and local trust reflect separate factor, 21 countries)
Configural 756.968 84 0.086 0.990 0.014
Metric 1123.686 144 0.079 0.986 0.048
Scalar 2394.798 204 0.099 0.969 0.059
Partial Scalar 1878.912 184 0.092 0.976 0.057
DF degrees of freedom, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, CFI comparative fit index, SRMR
standardized root mean square residual
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identified countries with multiple misspecifications (Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Estonia) and removed them before the model could reach
configural invariance with 29 countries (chi sq = 692.945, DF = 116; RMSEA = 0.067,
CFI = 0.991, SRMR = 0.020). These 29 countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, Great
Britain and Ukraine.
When testing for metric invariance, I released factor loading constraints on trust in the
police in Sweden, Azerbaijan and Armenia, armed forces in Sweden and Britain, gov-
ernment in Sweden and Kosovo, and political parties in Georgia and Kosovo. The model
reached partial metric invariance with good fit statistics (chi sq = 1242.068, DF = 215,
RMSEA = 0.066, CFI = 0.984, SRMR = 0.058). In the scalar invariant model, I released
equality constraints on intercepts on trust in the police, government and armed forces in all
countries, which resulted in acceptable partial scalar invariance (chi sq = 1886.738,
DF = 243, RMSEA = 0.078, CFI = 0.974, SRMR = 0.062). As a result, it is possible to
compare the correlates and means of political trust across 29 countries using this latent
factor (Table 2). The unstandardized factor loadings on the partial scalar invariant model
are available in Table 5.
A bi-dimensional model in which trust in the armed forces and police is reflected by a
separate factor reaches metric invariance with better fit statistics than the unidimensional
model, but it does not quite reach partial scalar invariance in the same countries (chi
sq = 3967.392, DF = 256, RMSEA = 0.115, CFI = 0.941, SRMR = 0.079) because I
was unable to release equality constraints on a factor with two indicators. As a result, one
can use the bi-dimensional model to compare correlates, but not means across countries. If
we line up the countries in order of the factor correlation in this bi-dimensional model, we
can visualize some of the regional variation in this measurement model. In Fig. 3, we can
see that Italy has the weakest factor correlation (0.327) and Uzbekistan the largest (0.809).
Again, there appears to be clustering by regime type. The weakest factor correlations
appear in Eastern and Western Europe and the strongest in the former Soviet states. This
means that trust in the police and armed forces has relatively little in common with trust in
Table 2 Model 2: error correlation between armed forces and police (29 countries)Data source EBRD and
World Bank. All available data are used in ML estimation
Chi square DF RMSEA CFI SRMR
Configural 692.945 116 0.067 0.991 0.020
Metric 1658.009 224 0.076 0.977 0.076
Partial metric 1242.068 215 0.066 0.984 0.058
Scalar 7821.219 327 0.144 0.880 0.167
Partial scalar 1886.738 243 0.078 0.974 0.062
Compare: bi-dimensional model (armed forces and police reflect separate factor, 29 countries)
Configural 692.945 116 0.067 0.991 0.020
Metric 1227.474 200 0.068 0.984 0.048
Scalar 4735.337 284 0.119 0.929 0.085
Partial scalar 3967.392 256 0.115 0.941 0.079
DF degrees of freedom, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, CFI comparative fit index, SRMR
standardized root mean square residual
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political institutions in the European part of the sample, and quite a lot in the former Soviet
states. Importantly, factor correlations on the former Soviet side inching close to 0.80 show
that there is a lack of discriminant validity between the factors. That is, trust in the police
and armed forces are appropriate measures of political trust in these countries. Specifying
an error correlation or two-factor model was likely part of the reason countries on this tail
of the sample had poor fit statistics and had to be excluded from invariance testing in the
first place.
8 Results: Model 3
In Model 3, trust in the government, parliament, political parties, courts and police load on
one factor with an error correlation between the latter two indicators. Here, I test whether
respondents conceive ‘‘order’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ institutions to be separate from political
institutions. As in the previous models, the model would not reach configural invariance
until I removed the countries with the most problematic misspecifications in JRule, where
significant MIs recommend error correlations between trust in courts and political parties
and between trust in parliament and government in Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Kosovo,
Uzbekistan and Macedonia. The model still did not achieve configural invariance after
removing these countries so I chose to remove countries with the next highest misspeci-
fications in JRule suggesting complicated error correlations (Turkey, Bosnia, Azerbaijan,
Moldova, Czech Republic and Ukraine). Unfortunately, the bulk of the excluded countries
are former Soviet autocracies, making this model less comparable across regime types.
The amount of misspecification confirms the inconsistent loadings of trust in the courts
in the initial EFA solutions: in most former Soviet states, parliaments and courts appear to
be under the sway of central political institutions. This also appears in the standardized
factor loadings (available in the Online Appendix). The five countries with the highest
loadings for trust in courts are Azerbaijan (0.863), Armenia (0.851), Tajikistan (0.840),
Montenegro (0.832) and Kosovo (0.780) while the ones with the lowest loadings are
Sweden (0.442), Great Britain (0.446), Latvia (0.463), Italy (0.501) and Lithuania (0.528).
Fig. 3 Countries are ranked by the ascending factor correlation between a political trust factor (measured
by trust in the government, parliament and political parties) and a protective trust factor (measured by trust
in the armed forces and police)
I. Schneider
123
Almost exactly the same pattern can be found regarding loadings for trust in the police.
The five countries with the highest loadings are Azerbaijan (0.722), Montenegro (0.677),
Uzbekistan (0.649), Tajikistan (0.646) and Kazakhstan (0.641) while the countries with the
lowest loadings are Italy (0.290), Great Britain (0.309), Sweden (0.343), Lithuania (0.355)
and Latvia (0.355). Respondents in former Soviet states and autocracies tend to associate
courts and police with political institutions whereas respondents in Western Europe and the
Baltics do not.
With 23 countries, the model reached acceptable fit statistics for configural invariance
(chi sq = 680.399, DF = 92, RMSEA = 0.077, CFI = 0.987, SRMR = 0.020). The final
23 countries are Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan and Great Britain.
The model did not reach metric invariance, so I used JRule to identify the most
problematic items. After releasing factor loading constraints on trust in the government in
Kyrgyzstan and Sweden as well as trust in the police and courts in all countries, the model
reached partial metric invariance (chi sq = 915.343, DF = 134, RMSEA = 0.073,
CFI = 0.983, SRMR = 0.042). The scalar invariance test produced very poor fit statistics.
Although I released intercept equality constraints on trust in the police, government and
political parties for all countries, the model failed to meet partial scalar invariance (chi
sq = 2491.689, DF = 156, RMSEA = 0.117, CFI = 0.950, SRMR = 0.112). The bi-di-
mensional model in which trust in the courts and police are reflected by a separate factor
performed better on metric invariance than the unidimensional model but also failed to
meet partial scalar invariance.
On this basis we can use both models to compare the correlates of political trust across
23 countries, but not means (Table 3). The size of the error correlation across countries
does not show clear geographical patterns, although, as expected, many former Soviet
autocracies have to be excluded from invariance testing because the courts and police tend
to load on federal-level political institutions. Interestingly, although this model has the
most theoretical support in the literature for representing ‘‘order’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ institutions,
it produces the poorest fit to the data within and across countries out of the four models
mainly because the courts and police are not neutral or independent of political sway in a
Table 3 Model 3: error correlation between courts and police (23 countries)Data source EBRD and World
Bank. All available data are used in ML estimation
Chi square DF RMSEA CFI SRMR
Configural 680.399 92 0.077 0.987 0.020
Metric 1580.448 180 0.084 0.970 0.082
Partial metric 915.343 134 0.073 0.983 0.042
Scalar 4216.209 222 0.128 0.915 0.234
Partial scalar 2491.689 156 0.117 0.950 0.112
Compare: bi-dimensional model (courts and police reflect separate factor, 23 countries)
Configural 680.397 92 0.077 0.987 0.020
Metric 1086.635 158 0.073 0.980 0.051
Scalar 3680.730 224 0.119 0.926 0.087
Partial scalar 3028.274 202 0.113 0.940 0.078
DF degrees of freedom, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, CFI comparative fit index, SRMR
standardized root mean square residual
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good part of the sample, contributing to disorder and undermining the rule of law rather
than the reverse.
9 Results: Model 4
In Model 4, trust indicators in the government, parliament, political parties, and local
government load on a single ‘political trust’ factor. This specification achieved configural
invariance for all 35 countries (chi sq = 453.666, DF = 70, RMSEA = 0.071,
CFI = 0.994, SRMR = 0.013). Model fit deteriorated under the test for metric invariance,
but after I released the problematic factor loading constraint on trust in the local gov-
ernment, the model achieved partial metric invariance (chi sq = 905.601, DF = 138,
RMSEA = 0.072, CFI = 0.989, SRMR = 0.048). When testing for scalar invariance, I
freed intercept equality constraints on trust in the local government and political parties in
all countries, but the model barely failed to meet partial scalar invariance (chi
sq = 1777.389, DF = 172, RMSEA = 0.093, CFI = 0.976, SRMR = 0.058). Though
this can be considered a borderline case, JRule shows that significant misspecifications
remain in nine countries. Any mean comparisons using this latent factor should be treated
with caution (Table 4).
A comparative model with only three indicators (excluding trust in local government)
also failed to meet partial scalar invariance (chi sq = 1293.938, DF = 102,
RMSEA = 0.104, CFI = 0.974, SRMR = 0.058). As expected, a simple model of polit-
ical trust without multidimensional indicators was able to reach partial metric invariance
across all countries, proving the most conducive of all models to a cross-national pooled
regression analysis using this survey. Comparing means of political trust using either of
these simple models, however, may be problematic due to the lack of partial scalar
invariance. Invariant unstandardized factor loadings for this model are available in
Table 5.
Because the four-indicator simple model managed to reach partial metric invariance for
all 35 countries in the sample, I have also included unstandardized factor loadings per
Table 4 Model 4: Simple Model. Trust in government, parliament, political parties and local government
load on a single ‘political trust’ factor. (35 countries)Data source EBRD and World Bank. All available data
are used in ML estimation
Chi square DF RMSEA CFI SRMR
Configural 453.666 70 0.071 0.994 0.013
Metric 1522.867 172 0.085 0.980 0.076
Partial metric 905.601 138 0.072 0.989 0.048
Scalar 3973.355 240 0.120 0.945 0.090
Partial scalar 1777.389 172 0.093 0.976 0.058
Compare: Simple model without trust in local government, 35 countries
Configural 0.001 0 0.000 1.000 0.000
Metric 432.608 68 0.070 0.992 0.052
Scalar 2274.023 136 0.120 0.953 0.075
Partial scalar 1293.938 102 0.104 0.974 0.058
DF degrees of freedom, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, CFI comparative fit index, SRMR
standardized root mean square residual
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country for this model in Table 6. A perusal of these results helps illustrate why trust in the
local government proved to be the most problematic indicator during invariance testing.
The five countries with the highest loadings for trust in local government are Tajikistan
(1.231), Kyrgyzstan (1.164), Azerbaijan (1.127), Uzbekistan (1.054) and Russia (1.031),
while the countries with the lowest are France (0.511), Estonia (0.512), the Czech Republic
(0.605), Latvia (0.628), Slovenia (0.640), Slovakia (0.650) and Lithuania (0.672).
Unsurprisingly, we see that respondents from countries in Central Europe and the Baltics
distinguish between local and federal levels of government, while those in former Soviet
autocracies do not. This is consistent with the results in Models 1 and 3.
10 Conclusion
Despite growth in comparative political trust research in the last two decades, scholars
have paid insufficient attention to the measurement validity and cross-national equivalence
of the concept. The most common approach to measurement has consisted of taking
averages or sum scores of diverse sets of indicators without theoretical justification. In this
paper I showed that this common ‘‘kitchen sink’’ approach to measurement is inappropriate
by investigating the measurement equivalence of political trust across thirty-five countries
in Europe and the former Soviet space using the 2010 Life in Transition II Survey.
Although issues in cross-national measurement are gaining attention in political trust
research, this is the first study to examine the measurement validity and equivalence of
political trust across diverse regime types.
I tested four models of political trust, finding that trust perceptions in political insti-
tutions like the government, parliament and political parties tend to differ from (1) trust in
regional and local political institutions, (2) trust in protective institutions like the armed
forces and police and (3) trust in order institutions like the courts and police. Measurement
models with error correlations along these dimensions of political trust all reached at least
partial metric invariance across most countries in the survey. This means that respondents
in diverse cultures and regime types understand subsets of survey questions similarly,
which allows us to compare the correlates of the latent factors from each model without
losing substantive meaning. Coefficient estimates in a pooled regression analysis will not













Trust in government 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000)
Trust in parliament 0.981 (0.006) 1.025 (0.007) 1.063 (0.008) 1.024 (0.006)
Trust in political parties 0.774 (0.007) 0.780 (0.006) 0.803 (0.008) 0.781 (0.006)
Trust in local gov. 0.848 (0.007) 0.745 (0.036)
Trust in regional gov. 0.898 (0.006)
Trust in courts 0.831 (0.034)
Trust in police 0.566 (0.007) 0.514 (0.040)
Trust in armed forces 0.525 (0.007)
All available data are used in ML estimation
Loadings are all significant (p\ 0.01)
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suffer from measurement-induced bias if these models of political trust are specified
correctly and used within the structural equations framework to control for measurement
error. It will not be enough to use sum scores or averages of each model’s combination of
indicators.









Albania 1.000 (0.000) 1.091 (0.046) 0.819 (0.041) 0.770 (0.041)
Armenia 1.000 (0.000) 1.002 (0.027) 0.791 (0.031) 0.887 (0.032)
Azerbaijan 1.000 (0.000) 1.168 (0.038) 0.948 (0.038) 1.127 (0.045)
Belarus 1.000 (0.000) 0.957 (0.026) 0.606 (0.036) 0.954 (0.028)
Bosnia 1.000 (0.000) 1.035 (0.022) 0.784 (0.026) 0.994 (0.025)
Bulgaria 1.000 (0.000) 0.978 (0.040) 0.802 (0.037) 0.824 (0.046)
Croatia 1.000 (0.000) 1.030 (0.034) 0.809 (0.033) 0.849 (0.042)
Czech Rep 1.000 (0.000) 1.072 (0.041) 0.817 (0.036) 0.605 (0.042)
Estonia 1.000 (0.000) 1.231 (0.084) 0.643 (0.052) 0.512 (0.050)
France 1.000 (0.000) 1.009 (0.059) 0.660 (0.042) 0.511 (0.047)
Georgia 1.000 (0.000) 1.005 (0.024) 0.567 (0.032) 0.973 (0.026)
Germany 1.000 (0.000) 1.002 (0.033) 0.703 (0.032) 0.791 (0.031)
Gr. Britain 1.000 (0.000) 1.021 (0.030) 0.711 (0.026) 0.783 (0.030)
Hungary 1.000 (0.000) 0.963 (0.031) 0.673 (0.028) 0.774 (0.032)
Italy 1.000 (0.000) 1.005 (0.033) 0.826 (0.032) 0.736 (0.039)
Kazakhstan 1.000 (0.000) 0.951 (0.026) 0.759 (0.032) 0.863 (0.027)
Kosovo 1.000 (0.000) 1.172 (0.039) 1.054 (0.041) 0.976 (0.037)
Kyrgyzstan 1.000 (0.000) 1.131 (0.078) 0.966 (0.073) 1.164 (0.072)
Latvia 1.000 (0.000) 1.043 (0.055) 0.718 (0.044) 0.628 (0.053)
Lithuania 1.000 (0.000) 0.993 (0.052) 0.755 (0.045) 0.672 (0.050)
Macedonia 1.000 (0.000) 0.993 (0.037) 0.750 (0.035) 0.937 (0.038)
Moldova 1.000 (0.000) 0.969 (0.022) 0.815 (0.026) 0.774 (0.028)
Mongolia 1.000 (0.000) 1.035 (0.050) 0.868 (0.047) 0.833 (0.047)
Montenegro 1.000 (0.000) 0.862 (0.022) 0.655 (0.027) 0.854 (0.024)
Poland 1.000 (0.000) 1.056 (0.030) 0.814 (0.029) 0.831 (0.028)
Romania 1.000 (0.000) 1.142 (0.046) 0.757 (0.040) 0.912 (0.055)
Russia 1.000 (0.000) 1.126 (0.036) 0.819 (0.033) 1.031 (0.036)
Serbia 1.000 (0.000) 1.062 (0.028) 0.804 (0.026) 0.892 (0.031)
Slovakia 1.000 (0.000) 1.021 (0.034) 0.838 (0.034) 0.650 (0.036)
Slovenia 1.000 (0.000) 1.039 (.046) 0.739 (.041) 0.640 (.042)
Sweden 1.000 (0.000) 0.901 (0.049) 0.698 (0.043) 0.780 (0.045)
Tajikistan 1.000 (0.000) 1.243 (0.044) 1.067 (0.055) 1.231 (0.045)
Turkey 1.000 (0.000) 0.963 (0.039) 0.640 (0.040) 0.866 (0.036)
Ukraine 1.000 (0.000) 0.969 (0.027) 0.737 (0.026) 0.764 (0.030)
Uzbekistan 1.000 (0.000) 1.050 (0.019) 0.998 (0.032) 1.054 (0.021)
All loadings are significant (p\ 0.01)
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While this outcome allows us a fair degree of optimism about the comparability of the
measurement models, the only model which was comparable across all thirty-five countries
was based on just four indicators (trust in the government, parliament, political parties and
local government). A handful of countries, usually former Soviet autocracies, had to be
excluded from invariance testing in the other models. Some variation in error correlations
proved to be non-trivial across regime types. I found that trust in local and federal-level
political institutions has relatively little in common in Eastern Europe, mildly more in
Western Europe, and significantly more in the former Soviet space. Political trust also
tends to be unrelated to trust in the police and armed forces across Europe, but strongly
related in the former Soviet space, suggesting the effects of corruption and stronger central
controls over these institutions. Likewise, citizens of former Soviet countries do not always
perceive courts to be independent of political influence.
Two models achieved partial scalar invariance, allowing for mean comparisons on the
latent factor across subsets of countries. The thirty-five country simple model of political
trust, however, barely failed to reach partial scalar invariance according to conventional fit
statistics. While this may appear disappointing for the prospects of cross-regime mean
comparison, some advances in latent variable modeling provide reason for optimism.
Oberski (2014) shows that a lack of invariance might not necessarily invalidate group
comparisons and introduces the EPC-interest statistic to assess the substantive relevance of
invariance misspecifications. A number of studies discuss the possibility of Bayesian
techniques to establish approximate measurement invariance where traditional fit statistics
appear to be overly strict (Muthe´n and Asparouhov 2012; Davidov et al. 2015; van de
Schoot et al. 2013; Zercher et al. 2015). Using these tools in cross-regime surveys to
improve invariance testing can be a fruitful direction for future research.
Substantively, this study opens interesting questions about what political trust truly
means. While factor analysis illuminates the regional clustering of measurement patterns
using typical survey questions, it cannot determine the nature and content of the studied
beliefs, nor the precise reasons for misfit. Qualitative probing studies can be useful to
capture local knowledge about political trustworthiness and to construct more cross-na-
tionally comparable survey items. Meanwhile, it is important to improve the way we use
even the simplest trust in government survey indicators in cross-national research.
Although political trust is believed to have profound consequences for how we are gov-
erned and relate to each other, we cannot properly assess its causes and effects without
diligently accounting for its measurement validity in diverse institutional contexts.
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